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1 Introduction 
 
In South Africa, section 6(2)(a)ii of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
1 
provides that it is a ground for judicial review if in taking an administrative 
action,
2 an administrator “was biased or reasonably suspected of bias”.
3 This 
article examines the meaning and application of this ground for review. Bias or 
reasonable suspicion of bias equates with actual and apparent bias 
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1  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, hereinafter PAJA. PAJA is the 
legislative compliance with the mandate of s 33 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa and provides that everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.  
2   ‘Administrative action’ is defined as the threshold of every activity that is sought to be 
governed by administrative law. S 1 of PAJA defines an administrative action as a decision 
made or a failure to make a decision by an organ of state exercising public power or 
performing a public function or a natural or juristic person exercising a public power or 
performing a public function. It is important to note that between 1993 and 2000, when 
PAJA was promulgated, South African courts were embattled with the interpretation of 
what an administrative act is. What follows hereafter is an illustration that is no way 
definitive: President of the Republic of South Africa v South Africa Rugby Football Union 
(3) 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC): The formulation of policy is not an administrative act; Permanent 
Secretary, Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) 
(Section 21) 2001 (2) SA 1: Allocation of appropriate funds to schools is an administrative 
act; Mkhatswa v Mkhatswa 2002 (3) SA 441 (T), Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade 
and Industry 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC): implementation of legislation is an administrative act; 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
1999 (1) SA 1 (CC): the exercising of legislative function is not administrative; Nel v Le 
Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC), Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC): the performance of 
a judicial function is not administrative; Transnet v Goodman Bros 2001 (12) SA 853 
(SCA): the tender process of government is an administrative act; and Claude Neon v City 
Council of Germistown 1995 (3) SA 710 (W): an act giving rise to a legitimate expectation 
is an administrative act. 
3  Hereinafter bias ground for review. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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respectively and reflects one of the rules of natural justice, the other being the 
right to a fair hearing.  
 
It is because no direct judicial interpretation of the bias ground for review has 
been undertaken by South African courts that I argue in this paper that there is 
a need for this interpretation and that what is at present applied as the test for 
administrative bias, namely the reasonable apprehension test enunciated in the 
case of President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby 
Football Union (2),
4 is not suitable for administrators. The reason for this is that 
it is designed for judicial officers, which is evident in the presumption of judicial 
impartiality that underpins the test, and the consequently high threshold for the 
finding of judicial bias. I further contend that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test, as 
interpreted in the cases of BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and 
Allied Workers Union
5 and S v Roberts,
6 is suitable for determining 
administrative bias because it depends on the impression of the reasonable 
observer in the position of the lay litigant and makes no presumptions, judicial 
or otherwise. I also argue that this interpretation of the bias ground for review is 
the one that enables a lower threshold for finding administrative bias. This 
lower threshold is justified because of the importance of maintaining public 
confidence in the administration. I review and disagree with decisions in a 
number of cases where South African courts and administrative tribunals have 
recognized and advocated the need for a different treatment of administrators, 
resulting in a higher threshold of bias. I contend that the reasonable suspicion 
test does not adequate dealing adequately with all ramifications of 
administrative bias, including the issue of institutional bias and vicarious 
partiality. Accordingly, I construct a model for determining administrative bias 
that combines the reasonable suspicion test and the curative mechanism of 
administrative appeal, as well as some level of judicial review. This is 
exemplified by the jurisprudence of article 6(1) of the European Convention of 
                                            
4  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union (2) 1999 
(4) SA 147 (CC). Hereinafter Sarfu 2. 
5  BTR Industries South Africa v Metal and Allied Workers Union (1992) 3 SA 673 (A). 
Hereinafter BTR Industries. 
6  S v Roberts 1999 (4) SA 915 (SCA). Hereinafter Roberts. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Human Rights, especially in the light of the contemplation of South African 
Magistrates’ Courts as a jurisdictional route for judicial review. 
 
In section two I review the existing jurisprudence for determining 
administrative bias in South Africa. In this section I examine the concept 
of actual bias and then consider the two tests of apparent bias, namely 
the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test and the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test. I 
also determine in this section whether the two tests are the same or differ 
significantly, and then consider how South African courts have dealt with 
the issue of institutional bias. In section three I construct a model for 
administrative bias and then consider the waiver of administrative bias in 
section four. Concluding remarks appear in section five. 
 
 
2  A review of the determination of administrative bias in South Africa  
 
In this section I review the existing jurisprudence on the determination of 
administrative bias. Two broad areas are dealt with below. The first is the test 
for determining administrative bias and the second the issue of institutional 
bias. 
 
 
2.1  The test for administrative bias 
 
Even though the bias ground for review stipulates bias or reasonable suspicion 
of bias, the cases examined below show that South African courts employ the 
reasonable suspicion test and the reasonable apprehension test when 
determining administrative bias. We shall now examine actual bias and then 
consider apparent bias. 
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2.1.1 Actual  bias 
 
The nature of the formulation of the bias ground for review seems to 
contemplate a distinction between actual and apparent bias, even though South 
African common law does not distinguish between actual and apparent bias as 
English common law
7 does. All allegations of bias are subjected to the test for 
apparent bias, even though conduct that would qualify as actual bias is more 
likely to be found in such a case. A few examples will suffice.  
 
In  Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board,
8 the blood relationship 
between the mayor of a municipality and an applicant who was one of the many 
applicants competing for a liquor licence before the local liquor licensing board 
was held by the court to be enough to create a likelihood of bias, especially as 
the mayor’s brother had won the licence. In Rose v Johannesburg Local Road 
Transportation Board,
9 the chairman of the Board was also a director of three 
powerful companies, one of which was the largest operator of taxis in 
Johannesburg and was opposed to the application which, if granted, would not 
have been to its benefit. The chairman refused to recuse himself and on review 
the court held that a reasonable man would apprehend that the chairman was 
biased.  
 
In Parag v Ladysmith City Council,
10 the nature of the relevant interest lay in 
the fact that members of a licensing appeal committee were also holders of a 
general dealers’ licence. A member of a boundary-determining commission was 
ordered by the court to recuse himself in Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v 
                                            
7  See the case of Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759 where 
the court held that actual bias exists where a judge is a party to a case or has pecuniary 
interest in a case. In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex 
parte Pinochet Ungarte (No. 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577, the House of Lords extended this 
class to non-pecuniary interests where the judges’ decision would lead to a promotion of a 
cause in which the judge was involved with one of the parties. 
8  Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board 1944 WLD 52. 
9  Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947 (4) SA 272 (W). 
10  Parg v Ladysmith City Council 1961 (3) SA 714 (N).  E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Administrator Transvaal
11 when it was established that he was also a member 
of a firm of consulting engineers who stood to benefit from the extension of the 
municipal boundaries.  
 
There is no doubt that personal interest of a financial nature will qualify as bias. 
Whether the non-pecuniary type of personal interest will also qualify will depend 
on the circumstances of the case. In any event, the stipulation that a 
reasonable suspicion of bias is enough to ground a review will take care of the 
cases that may be doubtful as representing actual bias. We now turn to the test 
for apparent bias. 
 
 
2.1.2  The test for apparent bias 
 
As was stated above, the second limb of the bias ground for review is 
‘reasonable suspicion of bias’. In this section I intend to establish what this 
means. I shall first consider the meaning of the reasonable suspicion of bias 
test to examine the reasonable apprehension test and then determine the 
difference between the two tests.  
 
 
2.1.2.1   The reasonable suspicion test in South Africa 
 
The ‘reasonable suspicion’ test for apparent bias was laid down in the case of 
BTR Industries. In this case, the Appellate Division stated that: 
 
…in our law the existence of a reasonable suspicion of bias satisfies 
the test; and that an apprehension of a real likelihood that the 
decision maker will be biased is not a prerequisite for disqualifying 
bias. The test is that of a ‘reasonable suspicion.
12  
                                            
11  Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Administrator Transvaal 1961 (3) SA 669 (T). See also 
the case of Bam-Mugwanya v Minister of Finance and Provincial Expenditure, Eastern 
Cape 2001 (4) SA 12.(ck).  
12   N 5 at p 693. See also Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Monnig 1992 
(3) SA 482 (A) (hereinafter Monnig). See also Moch v Nedtravel 1996 (3) SA 1 (A) 
(hereinafter Moch); De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (3) SA 340 (C); E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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The facts in BTR Industries are that in the course of a long drawn-out dispute 
between labour and the management of a company the President of the 
Industrial Court participated in a seminar arranged by management’s industrial 
relations consultant in which management’s lawyers all presented papers. In 
Roberts
 the Supreme Court of Appeal clarified this test. Howie ja said: 
  
The requirements of the test for the appearance of judicial bias are 
as follows as applied to judicial proceedings: (1) There must be a 
suspicion that the judicial officer might, not would, be biased. (2) The 
suspicion must be that of a reasonable person in the position of the 
accused or the litigant. (3) The suspicion must be based on 
reasonable grounds. (4) The suspicion is one which the reasonable 
person referred to would, not might, have.
13 
 
The court was quick to emphasise that: 
 
…if the suspicion of bias is one based on reasonable grounds the 
reasonable person would have it. If it were not so founded the 
reasonable person would not have it.
14 
 
It is important to note that many years after the Sarfu 2 test had been applied, 
albeit wrongly, as the test for administrative bias, South African courts and 
tribunals continue to use the BTR Industries and Roberts test. For example in 
County Fair Foods v Theron,
15 the conduct of an arbitration by a CCMA 
commissioner was held to have raised an apprehension of bias because of the 
manner in which he descended into the arena in the questioning of the 
employee. In reaching this decision the Labour Court applied the test in BTR 
Industries and noted Sarfu 2.
16 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
Ighayiya Technical College v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Eastern 
Cape  1998 (4) SA 502 (Ck). 
13  N 6 at p 924. 
14  Ibid at p 925. Emphasis original.  
15  County Fair Foods v Theron [2001] 2 BLLR 134 (LC). 
16 See  also  Afrox Ltd v Lata [1999] 5 BLLR 467 (LC) where the court applied the test in BTR 
Industries.  E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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2.1.2.2   The reasonable apprehension test  
 
In  Sarfu 2 the Constitutional Court of South Africa adopted the reasonable 
apprehension test.
17 In the course of an action instituted in the Constitutional 
Court against Nelson Mandela, the then President of the Republic of South 
Africa, an application for recusal was lodged before the Constitutional Court on 
the grounds that the applicant had a reasonable apprehension that every 
member of the court would be biased against him, and that he consequently 
might not get a fair trial. The general allegation made against all the members 
was that their bias would arise because they had been appointed by President 
Mandela. Further specific allegations were made against individual members of 
the court on the basis of personal and political links with Mr Mandela. The court 
laid down the proper approach to the application of recusal of members of a 
court. The court stated that: 
 
It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this 
application for the recusal of members of this court is objective and 
the onus of establishing it rests upon the applicant. The question is 
whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the 
correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not 
bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that 
is a mind open to persuasion by evidence and the submissions of 
counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed 
in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer 
justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath 
by reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that 
that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs 
or predispositions. They must take into account the fact they have a 
duty to sit in any case which they are not obliged to recuse 
themselves. At the same time it must never be forgotten that an 
impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a 
judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there 
are reasonable grounds on the part of litigant for apprehending that 
the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be 
impartial.
18  
 
                                            
17  This test has been adopted in Lesotho: Sole v Cullinan [2003] 3 All SA 466 (LesCA). For 
an analysis of this case, see Okpaluba 2004 TLR 1. It has also been followed in 
Swaziland. See Minister of Justice v Sapire (civ. App 49/ 2001, 10.6.02 unrep). 
18  Ibid at par 48. The court relied on the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v S. 
(R.D.) (1997) 118 CCC (3d) 353.  E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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One of the distinguishing features of the reasonable apprehension test in Sarfu 
2 is the presumption of judicial impartiality.
19 The other feature is that the 
determination of the bias depends on the court’s assessment of alleged 
evidence of bias, and not on the apprehension or suspicion of the litigant. An 
examination of the cases of BTR industries and Roberts shows that in none of 
the cases was the presumption of judicial impartiality used. That a new test
20 is 
introduced by Sarfu 2 is evident in SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson,
21 where the 
Constitutional Court in a majority judgment further explained the test. Speaking 
about the Sarfu 2 test the court said: 
 
In formulating the test the Court observed that two considerations 
are built into the test itself. The first is that in considering the 
application for recusal, the court as a starting point presumes that 
judicial officers are impartial in adjudicating disputes. As later 
emerges from the Sarfu judgment, this in-built aspect entails two 
further consequences. On the one hand, it is the applicant for 
recusal who bears the onus of rebutting the presumption of judicial 
impartiality. On the other hand, the presumption is not easily 
dislodged. It requires ‘cogent’ or ‘convincing’ evidence to be 
rebutted. The second in-built aspect of the test is that “absolute 
neutrality” is something of a chimera in the judicial context. This is 
because judges are human. They are unavoidably the product of 
their own life experiences, and the perspective thus derived 
inevitably and distinctively informs each judge’s performance of his 
or her judicial duties. But colourless neutrality stands in contrast to 
judicial impartiality – a distinction the Sarfu decision vividly 
illustrates. Impartiality is that quality of open-minded readiness to 
persuasion – without unfitting adherence to either party, or to the 
judge’s own predilections, preconceptions and personal views– that 
of a civilized system of adjudication. Impartiality requires in short a 
mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of 
counsel; and in contrast to neutrality, this is an absolute requirement 
in every judicial proceeding… The court in Sarfu further alluded to 
the apparently double requirement of reasonableness that the 
application of the test imports. Not only must the person 
                                            
19  On the presumption of judicial impartiality the Constitutional Court cited with approval, the 
dictum of Cory j in the R.v S. (R.D) ibid par 117: “Courts have rightly recognized that there 
is a presumption that judges will carry out their oath of office… This is one of the reasons 
why the threshold for a successful allegation of perceived judicial bias is high. However, 
despite this high threshold, the presumption can be displaced with ‘cogent evidence’ that 
demonstrates that something the judge has done gives rise to a reasonable apprehension 
of bias.”  
20  See Okpaluba 2003 JJS 109.  
21  SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC). Hereinafter SACCAWU 1. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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apprehending bias be a reasonable person, but the apprehension 
must in the circumstances be reasonable… The ‘double’ 
unreasonableness requirement also highlights the fact that mere 
apprehensiveness on the part of the litigant that a judge will be 
biased – even a strongly and honestly felt anxiety – is not enough. 
The court must carefully scrutinize the apprehension to determine 
whether it is to be regarded as reasonable. In adjudging this, the 
court superimposes a normative assessment on the litigant’s 
anxieties. It attributes to the litigant’s apprehension a legal value, 
and thereby decides whether it is such that should be countenanced 
by law.
22 
 
The minority judgment in this case brings into clearer relief the different 
approaches that are possible in the interpretation of the reasonable 
apprehension test. The dissenting opinion of Mokgoro and Sachs jj in 
SACCAWU 1 puts my argument in proper perspective: 
 
The test for recusal places a heavy burden of persuasion on the 
person alleging judicial bias or its appearance. But despite the 
presumption in favour of judges’ impartiality, the test requires an 
assessment of the litigant’s perception of impartiality… A judge 
called upon to decide whether or not a disqualifying apprehension of 
bias exists, however, should consider the apprehension of the lay 
litigant alleging bias and the reasonableness of that apprehension 
based on the actual circumstances of the case. As Cameron AJ 
points out, the lay litigant is assumed to be well-informed and 
equipped with the correct facts. But the lay litigant should not be 
expected to have the understanding of a trained lawyer and to 
appreciate the implications of the different nature of the appeal 
process. In both cases it will be the judges who decide and who 
must have an open mind. In all circumstances, the test emphasizes 
reasonableness in the light of the true facts, not the technical 
nuances of the particular case. It is our contention that the 
reasonableness of the apprehension also requires that the judge 
assess the lay litigant in her or his context.
23 
 
 
                                            
22   Ibid par 15-18. See also Sager v Smith 2001 (3) SA 1004 (SCA). 
23   Ibid par 56-58. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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2.1.2.3   A comparison of the 'reasonable apprehension' test and the 
'reasonable suspicion' test 
 
In this section we shall determine whether the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test is 
the same as the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test or if they are different, and explain 
this difference. In Sager v Smith,
24 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
use of the word ‘apprehension’ instead of ‘suspicion’ is a difference in 
terminology, which has no significance. In Sager v Smith,
25 the English Court of 
Appeal stated that in an overwhelming number of cases the practical 
application of the test of reasonable suspicion and the real danger (similar to 
the reasonable apprehension test) tests leads to the same result. 
 
It is my opinion that in practical terms there are significant differences between 
the two tests. The difference between the reasonable suspicion test and the 
Sarfu 2 test lies in the weight attached to the perception of the lay observer 
compared to the determination of the court. While the reasonable suspicion test 
depends on the perception of the lay observer and is therefore grounded in 
appearance, the Sarfu 2 test hinges on the determination of the court, which 
relies on reality evident in proof of actual bias. Consequently, the Sarfu 2 test 
results in a high threshold for finding bias, because the court is unlikely to find 
bias as it presumes that it is unlikely to be influenced by acts that may ordinarily 
give rise to the appearance of bias. The Sarfu 2 test deals with reality, which is 
all about a court's confidence that it will not be influenced. 
 
The reverse is the case with the reasonable suspicion test. The reasonable 
suspicion test depends on the lay observer’s perception, which is far removed 
from reality. As Dr Malleson argues with respect to the difference between the 
reasonable suspicion test and the real danger (similar to the reasonable 
apprehension test) tests:  
 
                                            
24  Ibid at par 15.  
25  Sager v Smith 2001 (3) SA 1004 (SCA); [2000] 2 WLR 870. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Despite a certain amount of confusion in the case law over the 
distinction between the two tests, it is now clear that the key 
difference is that the latter requires only the appearance  of bias, 
whereas the 'real danger' test requires that there is a likelihood of 
actual bias... in Locabail the court sought to play down the 
differences in practice between the 'reasonable suspicion' test and 
the 'real danger' test, stressing that in an overwhelming majority of 
cases the application of either test would lead to the same result. 
This conclusion glosses over the important practical effect of the real 
danger test in limiting the number of successful claims for 
disqualification in cases where the court is persuaded that the judge 
did not know of the matter relied upon as undermining his 
impartiality.
26  
 
The reasonable suspicion test therefore enables a lower threshold for finding 
bias and is therefore more likely to find bias than the Sarfu 2 test. 
 
 
2.2  A review of the application of the tests for administrative bias 
 
The cases considered below stress a lower standard for administrative bias, 
which is indicative of the fact that administrative officers and tribunals are 
unable to exercise the same level of competence as judicial officers. A lower 
standard would make it more difficult to determine administrative bias, because 
conduct that would have led to a finding of bias would be condoned. Thus a 
lower standard is akin to the high threshold that the reasonable apprehension 
test leads to. Using the 'real' apprehension test and a lower standard would 
result in a situation where it may be impossible to ever find administrative bias.  
What follows hereafter are three examples of a lower standard for 
administrative bias. The first example of this is found in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Competition Commission v 
General Council of the Bar of South Africa,
27 where the court decided that the 
failure of an administrative body to observe the requirements of natural justice 
in this case – fair hearing – is not always indicative of bias. This case arose out 
                                            
26 Malleson  2002  Legal Studies 56-57. Emphasis original. 
27  Commissioner of Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar of South Africa 
2002 (6) SA 606 (SCA).  E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
12/41 
of an application brought by the General Council of the Bar in South Africa 
before the South African Competition Commission. The court explained that:  
 
… the present is but one of the very many cases in which an 
administrative body has failed to observe a principle which lawyers 
regard as elementary and it will be a sad day if, whenever this 
occurs, the body can be accused or suspected of bias. It is 
unfortunately one of the facts of life that administrative bodies 
perform their functions with varying degrees of competence. 
Sometimes, depending mostly on the expertise of their members and 
staff, they meticulously observe the requirements of natural justice; 
but often they do not, not because they are biased, but because they 
are not skilled in administrative law or inexperienced and know no 
better, or because a particular requirement of natural justice is 
simply overlooked. Thus the mere fact that audi alteram partem was 
not observed does not by itself justify an inference of bias.
28 
  
Even though the principle enunciated by the court is correct, its application to 
the facts of the case is, with respect, wrong. While it is true that the non-
observance of the audi rule is not indicative of bias, the court ought to have 
concentrated on the manner in which the administrative body acted
29 as being 
critical in this circumstance and the basis of the appearance of bias.  The court 
even acknowledged that at the trial there was a stubborn attitude on the part of 
members of the commission, who were slow in realising the procedure to be 
followed in the assessment of the request of the General Council of the Bar and 
who felt that all that they had to do was allow the General Council of the Bar the 
opportunity to respond to the comments of the Minister. Indeed, the court said:  
 
Unless there is a change of heart on his part the prospects of the 
matter receiving proper treatment if it were to be remitted are not 
good.
30  
 
Again, here the court was swayed by what had really happened rather than the 
suspicion that the conduct of the administrative body had given rise to.  
                                            
28   Ibid par 16. 
29   Emphasis supplied. 
30   Par 17. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Another case advocating a different standard for administrative bias is the case 
of Kwazulu Transport v Mnguni,
31 where the Labour Court adopted the test in 
Sarfu 2 and declared: 
 
The test accordingly sets a high threshold for an applicant in a 
recusal application to meet. Where that threshold is pitched may 
vary depending on the circumstances of each case and the forum 
where the application is made. Thus it will be pitched much higher 
for an appellate bench where the personal attributes, traits and 
dispositions of each judge is reduced by the collegial nature of such 
forum. Appellate judges are also entrusted with a higher level of 
judicial office and also generally more experienced in the craft of 
judging. For this reason it would be more difficult to have an 
appellate judge recused than a trial judge. Similarly, adjudicators 
who are more experienced in labour dispute adjudication would be 
able to resist an application for recusal more easily than those who 
are not. The probability of a reasonable apprehension of bias is 
greater if the adjudicator is less experienced or is imposed by the 
parties than when the adjudicator is more experienced or chosen by 
the parties… Even though the test may be pitched at different levels 
in the hierarchy of the dispute resolution system it remains the same 
in the sense that an applicant will always have to show, in essence, 
a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a party to the 
proceedings.
32  
 
It is submitted that no matter the level of the threshold that is set for 
administrators, the fact that the test is based on the Sarfu 2 standard would 
enable administrative officers and tribunals to determine apparent bias from 
their perception. However, where the BTR Industries and Roberts test is the 
standard of the reasonable suspicion test, the nature of the administrative 
tribunal or officer becomes one of the factors in the determination of bias. It is, 
however, submitted that in practice, the considerations as outlined in Mnguni 
are often absent in the perception of the party to a case. 
 
Such considerations smack of the presumption of judicial impartiality, which is 
the hall mark of the Sarfu 2 test. What difference would it have made to the 
                                            
31  Kwazulu Transport v Mnguni [2001] 7 BLLR 770 (LC). Hereinafter Mnguni. 
32  Ibid at 772-773. The facts of this case are that after a commissioner in the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration was appointed the applicant applied for his recusal. 
The applicant contended that his had a reasonable apprehension of bias because the 
commissioner had represented his employees in litigation against him on three occasions. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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perception of the party to a case if the CCMA commissioner sat with 
colleagues? Would the applicant have believed that the collegial nature of the 
tribunal would mitigate the bias of one of the commissioners? Indeed, it is even 
likely that the applicant may believe that the commissioner will go a long way 
towards influencing the other members of the panel.  
 
The fact remains that the court applied the BTR Industries and Roberts test 
even if it noted and adopted the Sarfu 2 test. This approach may in our opinion 
be a result of the difficulty in understanding the true import of the two tests. The 
ruling of the commissioner on the application for recusal is indicative of the two 
approaches. Rather than consider whether there were grounds for a 
reasonable apprehension, he sought to prove that the nature of the relationship 
between him and the employees were too far fetched to influence him. It was 
therefore correct for the Labour Court to have held that the nature of the 
relationship was such that a party to the case would readily apprehend that he 
would be biased.  
 
It is interesting that in adopting the Canadian case of R. v S. (R.D.), the court in 
Sarfu 2 specifically cited with approval the concurring opinion of L’Heureux-
Dube and McLachlin jj
33 to the effect that:  
                                            
33  N 5 par 32. Canadian jurisprudence differentiates between judicial and administrative 
officers in the application of the test. Justice Grandpre in Committee of Justice and Liberty 
v The National Energy Board [1978] 1 S.C.R 369 in a dissenting opinion at p 395 stated 
that: “The question of bias in a member of a court of justice cannot be examined in the 
same light as that in a member of an administrative tribunal entrusted by statute with an 
administrative discretion exercised in the light of its experience and that of its technical 
advisers… The basic principle is of course the same, namely that natural justice must be 
rendered. But its application must take into consideration the special circumstances of the 
tribunal.” In Newfoundland Telephone Company Limited v The Board of Commissioners of 
Public Utilities [1992] 1 R.C.S. 623, the Canadian Supreme Court said: “…there is great 
diversity of administrative boards. Those that are primarily adjudicative in their function will 
be expected to comply with the standard applicable to courts… At the other end of the 
scale are boards with popularly elected members such as those dealing with planning and 
developments whose members are municipal councillors. With those boards, the standard 
will be much more lenient.” This is the same position in Australia. In Hot Holdings v Creasy 
[2002] HCA 51, Hanney j, who was part of the majority, was of the opinion that: “While the 
test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is the same for administrative and judicial 
decision-makers, its content may often be different. What is to be expected of a judge in 
judicial proceedings or a decision-maker in quasi-judicial proceedings will often be different 
from what is expected of a person making a purely administrative decision. One difference 
arises when the decision-maker is a Minister who is accountable to the Parliament and the E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
15/41 
 
Although judicial proceedings will generally be bound by the 
requirements of natural justice to a greater degree than will hearings 
before administrative tribunals…
34  
 
…the facts and the discussion in Sarfu 2 clearly do not deal with the extent of 
the application of the test to administrative officers and tribunals. 
 
The third example of a lower standard finds expression in the consequences of 
a finding of bias. There is incipient jurisprudence that the finding of 
administrative bias should not lead to recusal, possibly due to the expense and 
inconvenience this will involve. This is a clear example of a difference between 
administrative and judicial bias. In Schulte v Van der Berg,
35 Conradie j said: 
 
On the other hand, the nature of a complex administrative 
proceeding like s 418 enquiry is such that it would, in balancing the 
interests of individuals and the administration often be inappropriate 
to insist upon the grant of a remedy developed for and suited to 
judicial-type proceedings. The Court has to engage in a difficult 
balancing operation between the individual’s interests and the effect 
of recusal on the administration (and other participants in the 
administration process). Let me now venture upon the balancing act. 
An application for recusal of a commissioner on account of bias at 
the commencement of an enquiry would, generally speaking, cause 
less disruption and would, for that reason, be more favourably 
considered than an application such as the present one brought 
towards the end of a long inquiry where the aggrieved examinee has 
already given most of his evidence. Recusal as a remedy at this 
stage of the proceedings seems to me singularly inept.
36 
 
                                                                                                                               
electorate… Thus it will be ordinarily be very difficult to impute bias or reasonable 
apprehension of bias to the decision of the Minister who has considered all applications on 
their merits but made it clear that preference would be given to applicants who complied 
with government policy” (par 70). See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
v Jia Leng (2001) 205 CLR 507 (Hereinafter Jia). Kirby j, who dissented in Jia and in Hot 
Properties, was not ready to concede: “[t]hat simply because of the political character of a 
Minister’s office and consequent accountability to Parliament, he or she was exempted 
from compliance with the law against bias or from answering to the courts on that ground, 
if bias could be established by the evidence” (par 128).  
34  Par 40. Emphasis supplied. 
35  Schulte v Van der Berg and others NNO 1991 (3) SA 717 (C). 
36  At p 721. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Marais j was reluctant to follow the principle enunciated by his brother Judge, 
requiring further research and deliberation on the matter. However in Absa 
Bank Limited v Hoberman,
37 Van Zyl j agreed with Conradie j when he stated 
that: 
 
    …a court should, in deciding whether or not to remove a 
commissioner appointed in terms of s 418 of the Companies Act, 
have regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances underlying 
the competing interests of the parties involved. It should have a 
discretion not to remove a commissioner if it should not be to the 
general benefit of all interested parties to do so, even if it is satisfied 
that there is a perception of bias adhering to the commissioner.
38  
 
Van Zyl j had in the previous case of Ma-Afrika Groepbelange v Millman
39 
stated that the expense to be incurred and the inconvenience to be suffered in 
the appointment of a liquidator was a relevant factor in determining whether to 
remove the liquidator, even when the court was satisfied that he was biased. 
The expense incurred by a commissioner was not enough to deter Van Zyl j 
from ordering the replacement of a commissioner appointed under section 418 
of the Companies Act. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the Sarfu 2 test and the lower standard being 
advocated for administrative officers in the application of the Sarfu 2 test are 
not appropriate for administrative officers. It is the reasonable suspicion test as 
interpreted to mean the perceptions of a reasonable lay observer that is 
appropriate, because it enables a lower threshold and an easier finding of bias 
necessary to maintain public confidence in the administrative system. This is a 
point I shall return to later. 
 
                                            
37  Absa Bank Limited v Hoberman [1997] 2 All SA 88. 
38  At p 106. 
39  Ma-Afrika Groepbelange v Millman NO 1996 CLR 751 (C). E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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2.2.1 Institutional  bias 
  
The nature of institutional or structural bias is such that there is great merit in 
the contention that at least the manner in which the test for administrative bias 
is applied should be different. The nature of the administrative process is often 
institutionally biased in that in reaching a decision, the relevant body or officer 
has such an interest in the outcome of that decision that it becomes structurally 
biased. The critical question is whether the differentiated application would 
affect the finding of bias.  
 
Even though Lord Goff was insistent in Gough that the same test applies in full 
measure to administrators,
40 subsequent cases
41 and academic commentators 
argue that the test is different for administrative officers, especially in the case 
of institutional bias.
42 
 
In Monnig, the nature of the bias arose from the composition of the court martial 
of senior defence officers to deliberate on the alleged wrongdoings of the South 
African Defence Force. The institutional bias lay in the fact that that every 
empanelled court martial in the circumstances would likely be viewed as 
biased. The appellants argued that if the allegation of bias was upheld, the wide 
criminal jurisdiction of the court martial would be destroyed, something it was 
alleged would be contrary to the intention of parliament. The Appellate Division 
                                            
40  R v Gough (1993) 2 All ER 724 at 736-737. See also AT/T v Saudi Cable Corporation 
[2000] 1 Lyold’s Law Reports 22 (QB) and R v Gaming Board for Great Britain: Ex parte 
Beniam and Khaida [1970] QB 417. 
41 See  R v Hereford and Worster CC, ex p Wellington Parish Council [1996] JPL 573. 
42  See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action 546-548: 
“Closely related to the doctrine of necessity is that which permits public officials to exhibit 
certain kinds of bias in the exercise of their judgment or discretion on matters of public 
policy… The normal standards of impartiality implied in the adjudicative setting cannot 
meaningfully be applied to a body entitled to initiate a proposal and then to decide whether 
to proceed with it in the face of objections. What standards should be imposed on the 
Secretary of State for the Environment when he has to decide whether or not to confirm a 
compulsory purchase order or clearance order made by a local authority… or to allow an 
appeal against a refusal of planning permission? It would be inappropriate for the courts to 
insist on his maintaining the lofty detachment required of a judicial officer determining a lis 
inter partes. The Secretary of State’s decisions can seldom be wrenched entirely from their 
context and viewed in isolation from the government responsibilities.”  E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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ruled that in cases of institutional bias, the manner to proceed was to hold that 
the right of recusal existed in favour of the affected citizen requiring the 
officer(s) to recuse themselves, unless there could be read into the appropriate 
legislation an express or implied denial of this right. The doctrine of necessity 
would justify the express or implied denial.
43 The court noted that in this 
particular instance, the regular courts of the land had a concurrent jurisdiction 
with the court martial, and parliament therefore could not be regarded as having 
sanctioned the institutional bias inherent in the court martial.
44 
 
In Umfolozi Transport v Minister van Vervoer,
45 the institutional bias here was 
that the state tender board could not be expected to be impartial in considering 
the tender from state owned companies. The court assumed that the 
reasonable suspicion test was applicable to a non-judicial officer and held that 
the institutional bias inherent in the state tender board was intended by the 
provisions of the State Tender Board Act, which did not prohibit the tender 
board from considering tenders by companies owned by the state.  
 
Professor Devenish criticizes the judgment and argues that: 
 
The difficulty with the judgment is the question posed by the judge. 
Surely the appropriate question is not whether the legislature 
intended the board to have the relevant competence, but whether 
the relevant rule of natural justice was expressly or by clear 
implication excluded or limited by the legislature.
46  
 
He equally points out an important step in the consideration that is introduced 
by the 1996 Constitution. He argues that:  
 
Where, however, a statute by express words or necessary 
implication excludes the rule against bias, then such exclusion would 
                                            
43  The court adopted the opinion of De Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action 276: 
“An adjudicator who is subject to disqualification at common law may be required to sit if 
there is no other competent tribunal or if a quorum cannot be formed without him. Here the 
doctrine of necessity is applied to prevent a failure of justice.”  
44 See  also  Loggenberg v Roberts 1992 1 SA 393 (C); Dumbu v Commissioner of Prisons 
1992 1 SA 58 (E); Ciki v Commissioner of Correctional Services 1992 (2) SA 269 (E).  
45  Umfolozi Transport v Minister van Vervoer [1997] 2 All SA 548 (A). 
46 Devenish  2000  TSAR 397, 415. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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have to be compatible with the provisions of the limitation clause set 
out in section 36 of the constitution, which states that the restriction 
to the right to just administrative action must be reasonable and 
justifiable in an open society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom… 
47  
 
Another recent case of institutional bias is Financial Services Board v Pepkor 
Pension Fund,
48 where it was alleged that the closeness of the relationship 
between the Registrar of Pension Funds and the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) was such that any tribunal of which a member of the FSB was also a 
member could not be impartial. The contention was that the Financial Services 
Appeal Board was a partial tribunal because it had as its members the 
Registrar and a member of the FSB. The court construed the relevant acts and 
held that the relationship between the FSB and the Registrar were not close, as 
the board had no power to override the decision of the Registrar and held that 
the test is whether: 
 
…a substantial number of reasonable and informed users of the 
Appeal Board would think that there was a risk of partial decisions 
being made because of the one member’s connection with the Board 
and the Board’s relationship with the Registrar… I conclude 
therefore that the presence of a member of the Board does not taint 
the structure and composition of the Appeal Board. It is my 
judgment, an independent tribunal as envisaged by section 34 of the 
Constitution.
49 
 
The court was mindful of the inevitability of institutional bias when it said:   
 
…it would wreck havoc with our system of administrative 
adjudication if internal appeals to a higher authority within the same 
hierarchy were to be impermissible simply because a member of the 
appeal tribunal has some measure of general supervision or control 
over the conduct of a member of a lower tribunal.
50  
 
                                            
47  Ibid. 
48  Financial Services Board v Pepkor Pension Fund [1998] 4 All SA 129 (C). Hereinafter 
Financial Services Board. 
49  Ibid at p 136. See also Freedom of Expression Institute v President of the Ordinary Court 
Martial 1999 BCLR 261(C).  
50  Ibid at p 136. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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With due respect it is the reasonable suspicion that the institutional and 
structural links may lead to partiality that makes the issue of importance. It is 
noteworthy that rather than proceed to an examination of the issues as laid 
down in Monnig by seeking to find out if the legislature expressly or impliedly 
intended the curtailment of the right of recusal that arises in the cases of 
institutional bias, the court determined the nature of the relationship between 
the board and Registrar and then applied the reasonable apprehension test. 
The framework of the court’s decision was to identify the independence of the 
court as a means of making a finding of the impartiality of the court, especially 
as the question of institutional bias is involved. The court adopted the dictum of 
Lamer cjc in the Canadian case of R v Lippe
51 that: 
 
The overall objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to 
ensure a reasonable perception of impartiality.
52  
 
The court said of the dictum of Lamer cjc:  
 
He is speaking here not of apprehension of subjective bias but of 
apprehension of bias on an institutional level. The test for this kind of 
bias is stated in Lippe’s case… to be whether, having regard, inter 
alia, to the parties who appear before a decision maker, a fully 
informed person would harbour a reasonable apprehension of bias in 
a substantial number of cases.
53 
 
It is clear that even though the words ‘reasonable apprehension’ are used, it is 
far more akin to the BTR Industries and Roberts test than the Sarfu 2 test. Ross 
Kriel
54 describes the court’s reasoning as one which seeks to justify the 
institutional bias and it is submitted that he is correct.  
 
 
                                            
51   R v Lippe 5 CRR (2d) 31. 
52   At p 52. Per Lamer cjc. 
53   N 48, p 135. 
54   See Kriel 1999 Annual Survey of South African Law 73. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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2.3 Vicarious  partiality  
 
An interesting dimension of administrative bias that is quite akin to institutional 
bias is the concept of vicarious partiality. Even though there is no decided 
South African case on the matter, there is no doubt that it will emerge in due 
course because it is a critical feature of all administrative systems. Vicarious 
partiality occurs when an impartial head of an institution on the advice and 
recommendation of partial subordinates makes a decision. The question 
becomes whether the decision is biased. This was what confronted the 
Australian High Court in Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy.
55 
 
In this case, competing applicants applied for an exploration licence and made 
their presentations in public before the mining warden. After hearing their 
arguments the warden published his recommendations and his reasons. On the 
basis of a ballot the warden recommended that the appellant’s application be 
given priority. The warden forwarded his recommendation to the Minister for 
Mines, who subsequently took representations on the merits of the respective 
applications from interested persons and took advice from within his 
department. The departmental advice was contained in a minute and was 
signed by the Director General of the Department of Minerals and Energy of 
Western Australia. After a series of deliberations the Minister approved the 
Director General’s recommendation.  
 
The first respondents, who were competing applicants, sought an order of 
certiorari quashing the Minister’s decision on the basis that the decision by the 
Minister gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The alleged bias was 
the pecuniary interest of two officers of the Department who had been involved 
in the process within the Department that had led to the Director General’s 
advice to the Minister. Specifically, the interest was the holding of shares in a 
listed public company, which had an option to purchase an 80% interest in the 
exploration licence if it were granted to the company that won the exploration 
                                            
55   N 33. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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licence. One of the officers involved directly held shares in the company, while 
the son of the other officer held the shares.  
 
The latter officer deliberated with the Director General to arrive at the decision 
that the department should advise the Minister to accept the warden’s 
recommendation. In addition, the other officer was present at the meeting and 
was asked to prepare the minutes, even though evidence was led to show that 
he did not participate in the deliberations. A subordinate officer prepared the 
minutes and it was presented to the Director General, who made some 
corrections before it was forwarded to the Minister. It was not contested that 
neither the Minister nor the Director General had any personal or pecuniary 
interest in the matter. It was also clear that the Minister did not know of the 
shareholdings of officers or the part they played in the processes leading to the 
advice.  
 
The majority of the High Court of Australia
56 held that the impugned decision 
was that of the Minister who was the decision-maker, and he had no interest 
such as might give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on his part; he 
had no knowledge of the shareholdings of the officers and there is no ground to 
apprehend that he might have been influenced by a desire to promote their 
interests. The court agreed that the only ground for setting aside the Minister’s 
decision was on the ground of procedural unfairness, in that the exercise of the 
statutory power by the Minister had not been fair because of the presence of 
bias. The court further held that if the form of unfairness alleged was the 
actuality or the appearance of disqualifying bias, and that was said to result 
from the conduct or circumstances of a person other than the decision-maker, 
then the part played by that other person in relation to the decision would be 
important. 
 
                                            
56   Gleeson cj, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan jj. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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The court therefore held
57 that neither officer had played a central role in the 
decision-making process as they had made no significant contribution to the 
Minister’s decision and therefore their financial interest did not deprive the 
Minister’s decision of the appearance of impartiality. Hanney j formulated what 
can be taken to be a test of this dimension of administrative bias: 
 
A court will not conclude that there was a reasonable apprehension 
of bias merely because a person with an interest in the decision 
played a part in advising the decision-maker. The focus must be on 
the nature of the adviser’s interest, the part that person played in the 
decision-making process and the degree of independence observed 
by the decision-maker in making the decision. If there is a real and 
not a remote possibility that a Minister has not brought an 
independent mind to making his or her decision, the role and interest 
in the outcome of his or her officers may result in a finding of a 
reasonable apprehension of bias… Thus, the role played by an 
adviser is a critical factor in determining whether the interest of an 
adviser in the outcome of a decision taints the decision with bias or a 
reasonable apprehension of bias.
58 
 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia, whose decision the High Court 
overturned, dwelt on the apprehension of bias that the financial interest of the 
officer would give rise to, irrespective of the fact that the officer may not have 
                                            
57  The court adopted the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. In this case an immigration 
officer who made a decision relied on the recommendation of a subordinate officer, who 
had examined the case and made detailed notes and comments and expressed opinions 
strongly adverse to the applicant. The court found that the notes and comments gave rise 
to an apprehension of racial and other forms of bias. L’Heureux-Dube, who gave the 
decision of the court, said: “Procedural fairness also requires that decisions be made free 
from a reasonable apprehension of bias by an impartial decision maker. The respondent 
argues that Simpson J was correct to find that the notes of the [subordinate officer] cannot 
be considered to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias because it was [the 
superior officer] who was the actual decision-maker, who was simply reviewing the 
recommendation prepared by his subordinate. In my opinion, the duty to act fairly and 
therefore in a manner that does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias applies 
to all immigration officers who play a significant role in the making of decisions, whether 
they are subordinate reviewing officers or those who make the final decision. The 
subordinate officer plays an important part in the process and if a person with such a 
central role does not act impartially, the decision itself cannot be said to have been made 
in an impartial manner. In addition… the notes of [the subordinate officer] constitute the 
reasons for the decision, and if they give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias this 
taints the decision itself.” At p 849. 
58  N 31 par 72. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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had any significant part in the decision making process.
59 The lower court 
urged that it is the appearance that matters and not the reality, which was 
painstakingly pointed out by the majority in Hot Holdings. Kirby j, who was the 
sole dissenter, mirrored the framework of the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia when he said:  
 
The question is not one of fine analysis. Instead, it is whether, 
looking at this decision by the Minister, and the participation in the 
steps that led to it of the two senior officials of his department, a 
reasonable member of the public might conclude that there is a real 
possibility that the decision could have been affected by the earlier 
participation in it of officers who, personally or through their 
immediate families, had undisclosed interests of which they were 
aware and these interests would be advanced if the Minister 
accepted the departmental recommendation.
60 
 
Thus, while the whole court agreed that the reasonable apprehension test is 
applicable to administrative officers, the difference lay in the interpretation and 
application of that test. While the majority believed that the content should be 
guided by the nature of the function to be performed, Kirby j held that the 
perception of the public is critical. 
 
                                            
59 Glesson  cj,  ibid, par 13 reproduced the opinion of Sheller aj, whose judgment was agreed 
on by the full court: “In my opinion, the holding by an officer in the Department who had 
taken part, albeit at the periphery, in the giving of advice to grant an exploration licence on 
which the Minister acted, of an undisclosed share interest in a company with a direct 
interest in the grant of an exploration licence must give rise to a reasonable apprehension 
or suspicion on the part of a fair-minded and informed member of the public that the 
Minister, acting on or taking into account of such advice, which he believed was impartial, 
but which it could fairly be suspected was not, had himself for this reason not acted 
impartially.” The court agreed that the interest of the man whose son held the shares may 
not be disqualifying bias but that it strengthened the suspicion of the public. 
60  Par 132. Emphasis original. At par 145 he was more descriptive of the nature of the 
preferred interpretation of the apprehension: “The reasonable member of the public has 
neither the time nor the inclination to evaluate the detailed evidence and protestations 
such as have been made in this case. He or she, as a lay-person, simply sees a ministerial 
minute in which two senior departmental officers participated without declaring personal or 
familial pecuniary interest known to each of them. The ultimate decision is to be made by 
the Minister in the exercise of a largely unguided discretion.” In Jia, n 31 he said: “Being 
concerned primarily with the impact of events upon the persons affected and upon 
reasonable members of the public, what is involved is the general impression derived from 
the evidence, not a lawyers fine verbal analysis” at 552.  
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The interpretation favoured by the BTR Industries test is far more in 
accordance with the minority opinion of Kirby j in Hot properties. It is therefore 
submitted that this should be an adequate standard to deal with issues of 
vicarious partiality if it does arise in South Africa. 
 
To conclude this section, it is my opinion that even though the BTR Industries 
and Roberts test is far more appropriate in identifying administrative bias than 
the Sarfu 2 test, it is deficient in some respects. It is because of this deficiency 
that there may be a need to explore some additional steps that could serve to 
contain bias, because they would operate after the administrative officer or 
tribunal had reached a decision tainted with bias. Accordingly, in the next 
section I construct a model for dealing with administrative bias that combines 
the BTR Industries and Roberts test and the curative powers of administrative 
appeal and judicial review. 
 
 
3  A model for administrative bias in South Africa 
 
As stated above, I shall construct a model for assessing administrative bias in 
South Africa that combines the application of the test for bias as determined in 
the preceding section, the curative effect of administrative appeal and the 
curative effect of judicial review as exemplified by the jurisprudence of article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This model is important in 
order to adequately provide a consistent basis for determining administrative 
bias. This model hinges on the use of the reasonable suspicion test, which 
enables a lower threshold of bias and consequently imposes a higher standard 
of conduct on administrators. It recognises, however, that even though an 
administrator may be regarded as biased, there should be curative possibilities, 
either through an administrative appeal or judicial review. This is especially true 
of institutional bias. It is to a consideration of this model that I now turn. 
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3.1  The curative powers of judicial review 
 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
61 provides that: 
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of a criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. 
 
It is submitted that the article 6(1) jurisprudence is suitable for South African 
administrative law, especially as Magistrates’ Courts are contemplated as part 
of the courts
62 to undertake judicial review.
63 The jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s 
Court to undertake judicial review is to be a general one or in respect of a 
specified class of administrative actions as designated by the Minister of 
Justice.
64  
 
In R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State,
65 the House of Lords interpreted article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and held that a case of 
institutional bias can be cured by the fact that the decision is subject to judicial 
review. In that case, it was contended that certain statutory powers of the 
Secretary of State in relation to planning matters, compulsory purchase, 
railways and highways were incompatible with article 6(1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. The decisions of the Secretary 
of State were subject to judicial review, but not to appeal.  
 
The complaint against the Secretary of State was that when the Secretary of 
State took a decision instead of an inspector appointed by him, the Secretary of 
State’s role in making policy meant that he had such an interest in the decision 
that he could not be regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal. The 
                                            
61  For a general account of this jurisprudence, see Forsyth 2001 CLJ 449. 
62  The other courts are the Constitutional Court and the High Court. 
63  The definition of ‘court’ in PAJA is substituted by s 1 of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Amendment Act 53 of 2002. 
64  S 9A of PAJA inserted by Act 53 of 2002. 
65  R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State [2001] 2 All ER 92. Hereinafter Alconbury. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Divisional Court
66 upheld the complaints, holding that the availability of judicial 
review proceedings was not sufficient to render the impugned provisions 
compatible with article 6(1). The House of Lords held that some administrative 
decisions affecting civil rights were taken by ministers answerable to elected 
bodies, and that where such decisions were subject to review by a court, regard 
had to be paid to both stages of the process. 
 
Thus, although the Secretary of State was not himself an independent and 
impartial tribunal in certain cases of the exercising of his powers, the crucial 
question was whether there was sufficient judicial control to ensure 
determination by such a tribunal subsequently.
67 The court held that the 
jurisprudence did not require such a control to be by way of appeal on facts or 
merit. What was required was that there should be a sufficient review of legality 
of the decisions and procedures followed. The Lords further held that the 
judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court constituted such a review. 
 
The court based its decision on the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the case of Bryan v UK
68 in assessing the sufficiency of the 
review available to the High Court:  
 
                                            
66  After acknowledging that the English common law required a different standard for 
administrators, the Divisional Court held that article 6(1) of the Convention had changed 
the position: “But the question we have to ask is whether the position under domestic law 
can withstand the unqualified procedural right conferred by art. 6. We do not think it can. 
The common law approach has inevitably been determined by the constraints imposed by 
legislation. The logic is that if legislation vests a decision in a person who is biased or 
provides for a decision to be taken in a manner which is not compatible with the 
requirements of independence and impartiality, no breach of the requirements of fairness 
could be found. Such requirements of fairness as there may be must be accommodated to 
the relevant statutory scheme. But the question now is not how art. 6 can best be 
accommodated in the interests of fairness given the existing statutory scheme, but rather 
whether the scheme itself complies with art 6. To accept that the possibility of the common 
law bias is inherent in the system and mandated by parliament is merely to admit that the 
system involves structural bias and requires determinations to be made by a person who is 
not impartial. It must follow from these conclusions that the Secretary of State is not 
impartial in the manner required by art 6 because in each case his policy is in issue. This 
is not to say that there is anything wrong with his role as a policy maker. What is 
objectionable in terms of art 6 is that he should be the judge in his cause where his policy 
is in play. In other words he cannot be both policy maker and decision taker.” p 955 (par 
85-86). 
67 See  Albert v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR 533.  
68  Bryan v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 342. E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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… it is necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject 
matter appealed against, the manner in which that decision was 
arrived at, and the content of the dispute, including the desired and 
actual grounds of appeal.
69  
 
The principle in Alconbury was also applied in Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets 
London Borough Council,
70 where the claimant presented herself to the 
defendant local housing authority as a homeless person. The authority 
informed her that it owed her a duty under section 193 of the Housing Act to 
ensure that accommodation was available to her. In discharge of that duty the 
authority offered her a secure tenancy of a flat but she turned it down, claiming 
that the property was unsuitable. Consequently and pursuant to statutory 
provisions, the claimant requested an internal review of the authority’s decision 
to offer her that accommodation. An officer of the authority, who rejected the 
claimant’s reasons for refusal as unreasonable, conducted the review.  
 
The claimant disputed the factual findings that were the basis of the reviewing 
officer’s decision and appealed to the county court, under section 204(1) of the 
1996 Act, which permitted appeal on points of law. The judge quashed the 
decision, holding inter alia that the authority’s failure at least to give 
consideration to referring a review decision, which turned on questions of 
disputed fact, to an impartial tribunal wholly independent of the authority was 
incompatible with the claimant’s right under article 6(1) of the European 
Convention to have her ‘civil rights’ determined by an ‘independent and 
impartial tribunal’.  
 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the claimant appealed to the 
House of Lords, which was required to determine whether the reviewing officer 
constituted ‘an independent and impartial tribunal’ for the purposes of article 
6(1) and if not, whether the county court, on appeal under section 204 of the 
1996 Act, possessed ‘full jurisdiction’ so as to guarantee compliance with article 
                                            
69  At p 360-361. 
70  Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] 1 All ER 731. Hereinafter 
Runa Begum. See also Adan v Newham London Borough Council [2002]1 WLR 2120. For 
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6(1), given that section 204 enabled the county court to examine questions of 
law. The House of Lords held that the reviewing officer did not constitute an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’ for the purposes of article 6 of the 
convention, because as an employee whose personal impartiality could not be 
doubted, she was not independent of that authority when deciding whether the 
authority had discharged its admitted duty to the claimant. The court further 
held that the right of appeal under section 204 was sufficient to satisfy article 
6(1), because the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
provided compelling support for the conclusion that for reasons of good 
administration, the absence of a full fact-finding jurisdiction in the county court 
to which appeal lay from an administrative decision-making body did not 
disqualify that tribunal for the purpose of article 6.  
 
Lord Hoffman further explained the contemplation by the European Court of 
Human Rights of administrative decisions as part of ‘civil rights’
71 and what that 
had necessitated in the form of the curative appeal or review body: 
 
… from an early stage the Strasbourg Court has recognized that the 
extension of article 6 into administrative decision making has 
required … substantial modification of the full judicial model… It has 
said first, that an administrative decision within the extended scope 
of article 6 is a determination of civil rights and obligations and 
therefore prima facie has to be made by an independent tribunal. 
But, secondly, if the administrator is not independent (as will virtually 
be the case), it is permissible to consider whether the composite 
procedure of the administrative decision together with a right of 
appeal to a court is sufficient. Thirdly, it will be sufficient if the 
appellate (or reviewing) court has ‘full jurisdiction’ over the 
administrative decision. And fourthly as established in the landmark 
case of Bryan v United Kingdom …full jurisdiction does not 
necessarily mean jurisdiction to re-examine the merits of the case, 
but as I said in Alconbury… ‘jurisdiction to deal with the case as the 
nature of the decision requires’. It may be that the effect of Bryan is 
…administrative action falling within article 6 (and a great deal of 
administrative action still does not) should be subject to an 
                                            
71  See the case of Ringesien v Austria  (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 425 and Deumeland v 
Germany (1986) 8 EHRR 448; Salesi v Italy (1993) 26 EHRR 187; Mennitto v Italy (2002) 
34 EHRR 1122: A 6(1) extends beyond private law disputes in the traditional sense of 
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examination of its legality rather than its merits by an independent 
and impartial tribunal.
72 
  
The House of Lords accordingly interpreted the county court’s review 
jurisdiction on the lawfulness and fairness of the council’s action as satisfying 
the requirement of full jurisdiction. In Bryan a planning inspector dealt with the 
issue of whether buildings erected in the Green Belt could be considered from 
their appearance and layout to have been designed for the purposes of 
agriculture. This was a question of fact and degree. The European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that the planning inspector was not an ‘independent or 
impartial’ tribunal for the purposes of article 6(1). But it also held that the 
jurisdiction of the High Court was sufficient to comply with article 6(1), even 
though it could not substitute its own decision for that of the inspector – a 
critical feature of review – it was bound to satisfy itself that his conclusions were 
neither perverse nor irrational. 
 
Even though there were undisputed primary facts, the issue for the review of 
the court were the conclusions drawn from those facts. The court held that such 
an approach to questions of fact was a feature of the systems of judicial control 
of administrative decisions of the Member States of the Council of Europe and 
held that such an approach is reasonable in ‘specialised areas of the law’.  
 
In Rita Begum the House of Lords held that the distribution of welfare benefits 
qualified as a specialised area of the law. In the court’s opinion the appeal on 
points of law enabled the court to assess the reasonableness of the rejection of 
the provided accommodation by the applicant, which the county court could 
undertake even if there were incidental disputes of fact.  
 
Given the similarity between article 6(1) of the European Convention and 
section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
73 it is submitted 
                                            
72  Ibid, par 31-34.  
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that the jurisprudence of the former should be of persuasive authority to South 
African courts. On the one hand there is no doubt that judicial review of 
administrative action is not conceived in the same manner as in the English 
system, which requires lower courts to review decisions of administrators, 
which can then be appealed to the regular courts. The powers granted 
magistrates in South Africa could be designated in such a way that a review of 
the facts of the case for procedural fairness would satisfy the constitutional 
requirement of section 34. The advantage of this position is that it would be 
limited to cases of bias, so that the courts would not be flooded with cases and 
furthermore the Magistrate’s Court would only be concerned with the 
administrative procedure and not the merits. Finally, it would reduce the 
instances of judicial review before the High Court and the Constitutional Court 
as contemplated by PAJA. It is also important to point out that the challenge of 
this type of judicial review is to carefully circumscribe the type of administrative 
bias that could qualify. Cases of institutional bias or vicarious partiality would be 
good examples. 
 
 
3.2  The curative power of administrative appeal 
  
Given the different levels of the administrative structure in all legal systems, it is 
attractive to argue that issues of administrative bias can be cured by appeal 
within the administrative system. The Appellate Division in Monnig was urged to 
hold that the hearing of the Council of Review effectively cured the institutional 
bias in the court martial. It declined to do so. The court noted that in Turner v 
Jockey Club of South Africa,
74 the opinion of Megarry j in Leary v National 
Vehicle Builders
75 that:  
 
… if the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a 
fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought 
to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal … 
76  
                                            
74  Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974 3 SA 633(A). Hereinafter Leary. 
75  Leary v National Vehicle Builders [1970] 2 All ER 713 (Ch). 
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… had been trimmed and corrected by the Privy Council and the House of 
Lords in the cases of Calvin v Carr
77 and Lyold v McMahon
78 respectively, but 
declined to be persuaded by the new thinking because it involved principles 
enunciated in the field of proceedings of domestic tribunals of an 
unincorporated association which were unsuitable for a court martial. The court 
considered that even though composed of laymen, the court martial was akin to 
a court of law. It was therefore possible that, had the body in question not been 
adjudicatory, the Appellate Division may have been persuaded to adopt a 
curative principle.  
 
However, in Slagment v Building, Construction and Allied Workers’ Union
79 the 
majority
80 of the same Appellate Division agreed that an administrative appeal 
could under certain circumstances cure an initial lack of fair hearing. The 
circumstances in this regard would be a case where there is no adjudication 
before the action is taken and there is a full and fair hearing on appeal. The 
court would have come to a different decision had there been adjudication at 
the first tier.
81  
 
The facts of the case are that two employees who insisted on being heard 
together in a disciplinary hearing were dismissed after being given 45 minutes’ 
notice. The court held that this was procedurally unfair but that a subsequent 
hearing before another manager when they had had 12 days to reflect on their 
conduct and had sought advice was enough to cure the defect. Smallberger ja, 
                                            
77  Calvin v Carr [1979] 2 All ER 440 (PC). At p 447 Lord Wilberforce said: “(T)heir Lordships 
recognize and indeed assert that no clear and absolute rule can be laid down on the 
question whether defects in natural justice appearing at an original hearing, whether 
administrative or quasi-judicial can be ‘cured’ through appeal proceedings. The situations 
in which this issue arises are too diverse, and the rules by which they are governed are so 
various, that this must be so.” 
78  Lyold v McMahon [1987] 1 All ER 1118 (HL). 
79  Slagment v Building, Construction and Allied Workers’ Union 1995 (1) SA 742. Hereinafter 
Slagment. 
80  Nicholas aja, Hoexter ja, Grosskopf and Niebnaar ja in the majority. Smallberger ja differed 
inter alia on the question of the curative effect of the administrative appeal.  
81  The court distinguished the factual situation in Leary, where it stated that the observation 
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who differed from the majority, argued that the effect of the lack of an initial 
hearing on the dismissed employees is to place … 
 
…the burden of displacing an adverse decision... which for lack of 
natural justice (procedural unfairness) ought not to have reached.
82  
 
Even though given in the context of a lack of a fair hearing, it is possible to 
extend the opinion of the minority in Slagment to the issue of bias. Accordingly, 
it is submitted that the effect of the breach of natural justice, in this case bias, 
could be the determinant of the curative ability of the administrative appeal. If 
the absence of bias in the original administrative proceeding is such that an 
undue burden would be placed on the individual, the appeal should not be 
curative. One clear instance of such a burden is when the review is on the 
record and does not involve a complete rehearing.
83 It may be far easier to 
prove that the appeal is curative if it is a review enabling a de novo hearing.  It 
may be possible to also argue that the presence of an administrative appeal 
could be curative because that administrator was not biased or reasonably 
suspected of bias. 
 
The principle of curing by administrative appeal would not conflict with the bias 
ground for review. Indeed it will complement it in the sense that it will enable an 
interpretation that would seek to establish whether the existence of an impartial 
higher administrative officer would lead the reasonable observer to agree that 
there was no reasonable suspicion of bias. 
 
 
                                            
82  Ibid at p 761. His Lordship agreed that in exceptional circumstances, an administrative 
appeal could cure a defective initial hearing. It was, however, made clear that this would 
not be in the circumstances where the lack of a fair hearing is the fault of the dismissed 
persons. The minority stated that, in this case, the lack of a fair hearing was not the fault of 
the employees. See also Slade v Pretoria Rent Board 1943 TPD 131. 
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4 Waiver  of  administrative bias 
 
The nature of the administrative process is such that citizens can be taken to 
waive their right to an impartial decision by administrative officers and tribunals. 
Public administration seems to contemplate this and in a sense it may be that 
citizens have no choice other than to embrace an administrative process that 
offers no alternative. It is valid to argue that the constitutional requirement of 
administrative impartiality is illusory given the widespread possibility of 
institutional bias. Indeed it may well be that PAJA contemplated the individual 
administrator without considering how institutions are relevant in this regard. 
The argument for waiver is indeed serious and may be counterproductive 
because of the fact that citizens may not have any choice as to how their 
administrative issues are handled. To further regard them as having waived this 
right may indeed be too much because of the inevitability of their action. It is 
therefore submitted that a waiver in such circumstances will indeed be unreal 
and unfair. The situation would be different if a citizen has a choice as to the 
administrator or institution. A selection in this regard could then be regarded as 
a waiver. 
 
It is further submitted that PAJA’s requirement of a reasonable suspicion of bias 
as the standard may do away with the question of waiver. At all times what is 
relevant is how the administrator or agency is perceived. It may well be that 
participation by the citizen in the process may assist the court in reaching a 
decision that there is no reasonable suspicion of bias. 
 
 
  
5 Concluding  remarks 
 
It is hoped that the South African Constitutional Court will at the earliest 
opportunity interpret the provisions of section 6(2)a(ii) of PAJA in a manner that 
reinforces the BTR Industries and Roberts test. This will ensure that finding 
administrative bias is dependent on the reasonable lay observer and not on the 
determination of the tribunal, which is the hallmark of the Sarfu 2 test. The BTR E S NWAUCHE    PER 2005(1) 
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Industries and Roberts test reduces the threshold for the finding of bias and 
thus ensures the strengthening of public confidence in the administrative 
structures of the State.  
 
It is also my view that the incipient trend by the lower courts in South Africa to 
regard administrative officers as deserving a different treatment in the 
determination and application of the reasonable apprehension tests is reason 
for concern. While it may well be that this is a reaction to the Sarfu 2 test in 
recognizing that administrative officers require a different treatment, the manner 
in which this different treatment is advocated is such that it essentially 
condones administrative bias. This is the path towards diminishing public 
confidence in the administrative system. Public confidence in administration is 
as important as its confidence in the judiciary. The well-celebrated dictum of 
Lord Hewart L.C. in R v Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy
84 that justice must not 
only be done but must be seen to be done, applies equally in my opinion to 
administrators. It is therefore on this ground that costs and expense should not 
be a reason for not disqualifying an administrative officer who is biased. If, in 
the process, an expensive inquiry is stopped, leading to great cost and 
inconvenience, so be it. The answer to concerns of cost and inconvenience is 
not to seek a change in the effect of review but to evolve rules that enable 
issues of recusal to be more easily detected administratively. In Hot Holdings, 
Kirby j adopted
85 the opinion of Professor Carney that: 
 
Public integrity as an ideal which must be nurtured and safeguarded, 
describes the obligation of all public officials to act always and 
exclusively in the public interest and not in furtherance of their own 
personal interests. ... [C]onduct less heinous than that of corruption 
may ... betray this trust. An example of this latter conduct is when a 
public official acts in the course of carrying out official duties in a way 
which also promotes his or her personal interests. Acting in this way, 
in the face of a conflict of interest between one's personal interest 
and the public interest, constitutes a betrayal of the public trust. But 
even if no betrayal in fact occurs, it taints the decision and the 
decision-maker with allegations of impropriety. The dangers posed 
for the public interest by the existence of conflicts of interest on the 
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part of public officials, whether the conflicts of interests are real or 
perceived to be real, demand the adoption of mechanisms which 
prevent such conflicts arising or which resolve them if they do 
arise.
86 
 
It is submitted that the concerns of Professor Carney apply to administrators 
everywhere, including South Africa. Indeed, section 195 of the South African 
Constitution declares the basic values and principles governing public 
administration. Paragraph (d) thereof states that “services must be provided 
impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.” In this regard it may be necessary 
to achieve this goal by introducing a model as advocated above. 
 
The possibility of curing by administrative appeal could also become a 
significant factor in the determination of a reasonable suspicion of bias. Thus a 
higher administrative officer or tribunal’s determination of the matter could lead 
a court to conclude that there had been no bias. The recent recognition of 
Magistrates’ Courts in the hierarchy of judicial review in the South African 
judicial system presents a good reason of assessing the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, especially as applied by English courts in 
determining whether to designate these courts as avenues for review as to 
facts of administrative action such that any administrative bias may be cured 
thereby.  
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